

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
20 November 1961

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Copy No.

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Situation in the Congo

1. The failure to date of the Adoula government, either by negotiation or by military force, to achieve its primary objective of asserting control over Katanga is seriously undermining Adoula. The UN's defeat at the hands of Tshombé's European-supported forces in September, and the impotence and indiscipline of his own Congo army forces in their "invasion" of Katanga have put Adoula entirely on the defensive; his hope now seems to be that a shift in the situation or a new initiative from outside will rescue him. Congo army leaders are similarly demoralized and have suggested that the only solution is to disarm the present forces and begin again.

2. Gizenga refuses to return to Leopoldville, is attempting to erect a new "anti-imperialist" National Lumumba Party under his control, and has mounted his own "invasion" of Katanga. Radical nationalists in Leopoldville, while watching to see how Gizenga fares in these efforts, are pressing Adoula hard to accept Soviet military and economic aid. The Soviet Union has offered aid, including transport and military aircraft and a monthly subsidy. Adoula is sufficiently desperate that he is reported to be "sorely tempted" by the Russian offers. For the moment the Russians appear to believe that their objectives stand more chance of realization through efforts with the legal government, rather than through direct support of Gizenga in Stanleyville.

3. Tshombé continues to claim he is ready to negotiate a settlement with Leopoldville, but he clearly expects to force acceptance of practically complete

Katangan autonomy. Tshombé apparently believes that should a radical leftist takeover occur in Leopoldville, the West would be forced to turn to him. Tshombé's backers--influential Belgians, French, British, and Portuguese--remain intent on preserving their economic stake in Katanga and on preventing penetration by radical Africanism there and into the Rhodesias. As long as the present situation persists these interests are unlikely to moderate their stands, despite pressures from the UN, the US and the Belgian government.

4. Despite Belgian public opinion which feels the UN has made Brussels the scapegoat for its set-backs in the Congo, Spaak has shown considerable courage in advocating cooperation with the United Nations. Spaak believes that any use of force against Tshombé would play into the hands of the Communists.

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5. Tshombé remains the UN's principal target in New York and in the Congo. UN forces were severely shaken by his victory in September. They have since given close support to Leopoldville's efforts to take over northern Katanga and emphasize that Tshombé's European mercenaries must be ousted.

6. The UN, which has always moved gingerly against Gizenga, appears to have dropped its demands to use force against him and is again hoping to negotiate his return to Leopoldville.

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7. Mobutu's Congo army forces which attempted in early November to invade Katanga from Kasai province have withdrawn and are holed up in Kasai. Gizengist Congo army forces from Stanleyville which were moving south to Kindu and Kasongo preparatory to invading Northern Katanga are stalled in Kivu province. Only a few--(100 at Albertville)--have entered Katanga and UN Indian troops have them under control there. We don't know where Gizenga himself is.

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8. UN forces have been reinforced in Kindu in the action aimed at punishing the Gizengist army units responsible for the murder of the 13 Italian aircrewmembers, and to relieve the 206-man UN Malayan unit which was surrounded by these forces at Kindu airport.

9. Tshombé's forces remain in place in southern Katanga, except for Kongolo in northern Katanga which Tshombé has reinforced.

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